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ABSTRACT 
This paper challenges the view that Sperber & Wilson's Relevance Theory is intrinsically 
asocial. To this effect, it is firstly shown how Relevance Theory provides a more 
satisfactory explanation of the 'politeness' of imperative sentences than Brown & 
Levinson's treatment. Secondly' supposed examples of the theory's inability to explain 
socially motivated instances of language use presented by O'Neill are examined and shown 
to be well within its explanatory power. Finally, a more general argument is presented. 
Recent insights from evolutionary psychology are drawn on in order to demónstrate how 
Sperber & Wilson's account of the way humans interpret utterances is able to 
accommodate a social dimensión. 
1. Introduction 
Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) is asocial. Or so some authors (Mey and Talbot, 1988; 
O'Neill, 1988-89; Talbot, 1993) would have us believe. There are two ways this assertion 
can be taken. One might take it as a criticism of Sperber & Wilson's book Relevance, in 
which scant attention is paid to issues of sociolinguistic nature. Alternatively, one might 
take it to mean that the theory itself can neither accommodate ñor shed light on such issues. 
On the first reading, the assertion is irrefutable; on the second, however, there is much that 
can be said, some of which I want to say in this paper. 
The distaste the authors referred to above have for RT stems from what they see as its 
"cognitivist" or "propositional" nature (O'Neill, 1988-89:243) and what they claim to be its 
characterisation of humans as "information processors" (Talbot, 1993:3525). Now humans 
certainly are information processors, among other things, and viewing them as such does 
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- a relevance theorist would argüe - shed light on how they communicate. But tlüs is not to 
deny that they are also social beings (though the claim that they are social beings does, as 
lar as 1 can see, entail the claim that they are also information processors). Thus rather than 
simply dismissing RT, the sociolinguistically oriented critic should ask whether the RT view 
of humans as efficient information processors - and the detail in which Sperber & Wilson 
expand on and defend tbis view - can assist in the search for answers to what have 
traditionally been thought of as sociolinguistic problems. 
In an attempt to at least start trying to answer this question, I argüe (in Jary, 1998) that 
RT offers a lar richer and more finely grained picture of linguistic poüteness and polite 
verbal behaviour than the competing Gricean norm-based accovmt proposed by Brown and 
Levinson(1987, henceforth B&L). I show how viewing communication in RT terms - i.e. 
as the result of ostensive acts designed to modify the mutual cognitive environment of the 
communicators - allows us to distinguish those cases where politeness is communicated 
from those where so-called polite behaviour is motivated by otlier aims - aims which 
become clear once the RT view of communication is accepted. On this view, polite 
behaviour is motivated by the desire not to forego longer term aims, such as the 
maintenance or raising of status within a group, simply to fulfil the short term aim of 
communication. The strategic use of polite forms/strategies is then seen as an exploitation 
of expectations resulting from this primary motivation. I must therefore disagree with 
O'Neill's claim that: 
This 'propositional' view of relevance ignores, and in consequence has difficulty in 
accounting for, the kinds of phenomenon [sic] highlighted by more sociolinguistically 
oriented linguistic theory - for example, the use of language in maintaining and 
strengthening social relations and in the exercise of power, and the social constraints on 
language use that come under the misleading label of 'politeness' (1988-89:243). 
In this paper I offer further evidence against this position by looking more closely at 
B&L's characterisation of the use of imperative sentences as examples of bald on-record 
poüteness. I then discuss four cases which O'Neill proposes as evidence against RT' s ability 
to account for or illuminate certain types of language use. The observations I make and the 
arguments I present in these two sections provide the basis for some more general comments 
about the ability of RT to accommodate a social dimensión. 
2. The politeness of imperatives 
For B&L (1987:95), imperatives are "clear examples of bald-on-record usage"; that is, the 
use of imperatives is a case of communication without any attempt to satisfy the hearer's 
face, though, B&L stress, this may only be apparent and in some cases the speaker may 
minimise face-threats by implication if he performs a seemingly face-threatening act baldly 
on-record. Moreover, according to B&L, imperatives are often used to supply metaphoric 
urgency to a request. 
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These claims, which will be discussed more ftilly below, are forced on B&L by their 
adherence to a speech act based view of communication which sees linguistic forros as 
specified for the performance of certain speech acts (see B&L 1987: 10 where they express 
regrets at having relied so heavily on this theoretical approach). On this view, imperatives 
are specified for performing directive speech acts, and such acts are intrinsically 
face-threatening on the B&L approach because they challenge the hearers negative face, i. e. 
bis want that his actions be unimpeded by others. 
Contrast this with the RT account of imperatives put forward by Wilson & Sperber 
(1988a & b) and developed by Clark (1991, 1993a & b). Here, the imperative is not 
specified for performing any particular act other than that of describing a state of affairs 
which although non-actual is both potential and desirable. It is potential in that it is 
compatible with all the speaker's assumptions about the actual world, while to whom this 
state of affairs is desirable is leftunspecified by the semantics of imperative sentences and 
determined pragmatically by the combination of contextual features and considerations of 
relevance. This allows Wilson & Sperber to divide uses of the imperative into two types: 
those where the state of affairs is desirable to the speaker, such as orders and pleas; and 
those where it is desirable to the hearer, such as permission and advice. In doing so, they 
are able to account for a wide range of imperative usage while mamtaining a unitary 
semantics. 
In this section, I want to re-examine B&L's analysis of imperatives from a 
relevance-theoretic perspective. In particular, I want to demónstrate how the RT account 
of imperatives outlined above can better explain the range of situations in which imperatives 
are appropriately employed. 
B&L argüe that bald-on-record strategies will be employed either because face is 
ignored or irrelevant and henee there is no need to minimise face-threat; or because "by 
doing the FTA baldly on record, S minimizes face threats by implication" (1987:95). The 
first of these is illustrated with cases in which máximum efficieney is paramount and to use 
an alternative form would decrease the urgeney conveyed, as exemplified by (1) and (2): 
(1) Help! [B&L's (1)] 
(2) Watch out! [B&L's (2)] 
(1987:96) 
That (1) and (2) convey a sense of urgeney is not in doubt; the question is whether this is a 
result the use of an imperative sentence or of other considerations such as the fact that they 
are shouted, or that certain encyclopaedic information is made accessible by the lexical 
items used (e.g. 'people shout "Help" when in danger'). The latter seems the most likely 
case for other imperatives do not necessarily convey any sense of urgeney. Consider (3), 
for example, which might be found on a packaging box: 
(3) Open other end. 
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But if urgency is not automatically conveyed by imperatives, this raakes it difficult to agree 
with B&L that the following are examples of speaking "as ¿/"máximum efficiency were very 
important [to provide] metaphorical urgency for emphasis" (1987:96, original emphasis). 
Conversational attention-getters: 
(4) Listen, Tve got an idea. [B&L's (7)] 
(5) Hear me out:... [B&L's (8)] 
Begging: 
(6) Give money. [B&L' s (11)] 
Formulaic entreaties: 
(7) Forgive me. [B&L's (12)] 
(8) Excuse me. [B&L's (12)] 
(9) Accept my thanks. [B&L's (13)] 
Metaphorical entreaties: 
(10) Send me a posteard. [B&L's (15)] 
(11) Don't forgetus! [B&L's (16)] 
(1987:96-7) 
As B&L themselves note (1987:96, fh. 29), claiming that these are metaphorical uses of the 
imperative opens up the possibility of any counter-example to their model being described 
as such. Their response is to await a sophisticated theory of metaphor which they can 
incorpórate into their model to account for these cases. However, on the RT account 
outlined here, there is no need to posit metaphoric use in the first place, for it is easily able 
to explain (4) to (11). In all cases, the speaker, by uttering the imperative sentence, makes 
mutually manifest her belief that the state of affairs described by the imperative sentence is 
both potential and desirable, and contextual factors and considerations of relevance guide 
the hearer to an interpretation in which the state of affairs is desirable to the speaker. 
However, in communicating her desire in this way she necessarily makes mutually manifest 
her belief that her desire is relevant to her hearer,1 for this premise must be supplied if the 
hearer is to arrive at the intended interpretation. This is because every ostensive act 
communicates the presumption that the communicator beüeves her message is relevant to 
the addressee. Desirable-to-the-speaker instances of utterances of imperative sentences 
therefore make mutually manifest (a) the speaker' s assumption that a certain state of affairs 
is desirable to her; (b) her belief that this information regarding her desires is relevant to her 
audience. It is this, I want to argüe, that is the key to understanding the circumstances under 
which it is appropriate to employ an imperative in an attempt to get someone to perform a 
certain act. That is, it is appropriate to employ an imperative with a 
'desirable-to-the-speaker' interpretation only if the speaker's desire is relevant to her 
hearer. Thus the conversational attention-getters (4) and (5) are appropriate among peers 
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only if the conversational contribution that follows is a pertinent one, for this justifies the 
speaker's belief that her desire to be heard is relevant to her audience. In the case of begging 
(6), the speaker's desire that the hearer give him money is assumed to be relevant to the 
hearer, for if it is not then the hearer is, by implication, a cold-hearted individual who has 
no concern for the suffering of his fellow humans. The formulaic entreaties illustrated by 
(7) and (8) all perform acts which threaten the speaker's face: a request for forgiveness; an 
apology; and an expression of gratitude. These musí all follow some prior act, either by the 
speaker to the detriment of the hearer (forgiveness and apology) or by the hearer in the 
speaker's favour. The speaker's belief that her desire that/? is relevant to her hearer is thus 
justiñed by the fact that these desires are all in his favour as they either redress face-damage 
or acknowledge generosity. Lastly, metaphorical entreaties make manifest the speaker's 
desire that the hearer perform an act which she would only sincerely ask him-to perform if 
she felt affection for him.2 Thus again, her desire that/? is relevant to him. 
Of course, another situation where a speaker's desires are relevant to her hearer is when 
she has a power advantage over him. Indeed, it is this association with power that has 
probably earned the imperative its reputation as an impolite form. Scollon & Scollon (1983) 
note how, in broad terms, the strategies of verbal communication used by a superior in an 
asymmetrical power relationship are also those favoured by participants who emphasise 
solidarity, rather than deference, in symmetrical power relationships. Indeed, they re-label 
B&L's positive and negative politeness 'solidarity' and 'deference' politeness respectively, 
and include bald-on-record use as a feature of soüdarity politeness (though perhaps 
'softened' by the use of in-group identity markers). To see why imperatives are appropriate 
in such settings, recall that to direct one's verbal behaviour at reinforcing the hearer's 
positive face is to address his "perennial desire that his wants [...] should be thought of as 
desirable" (B&L, 1987:101). Thus a soüdarity politeness system is one in which the desires 
of one participant are extremely relevant to others and, on the present account, it is 
therefore no surprise that imperative use is a feature of such a system: utterances of 
imperative sentences are the optimum way of making one's desires concerning one's 
hearer's actions manifest to him. 
Wilson & Sperber's account also sheds light on B&L's second group of imperative 
usage: cases where face concerns are not overridden by other factors - as B&L claim for the 
previously discussed group of examples - but where doing the FTA is itself polite. B&L list 
three broad áreas where one would expect to fínd such usage: 
(i) welcomings (or post-greetings), where S insist that H may impose on his negative face; 
(ii) farewells, where S insists that H may transgress on his positive face by taking his 
leave; (iii) offers, where S insists that H may impose on S's negative face. (1987:99) 
The idea here is that in such cases "it is reasonable for S to assume that H will be 
especially preoccupied with H's potential infringements of S's preserve". In such a case, it 
is argued, the speaker can do the FTA with impunity, for in doing so she "alleviate[s] H's 
anxieties by pre-emptively inviting H to impinge on S's negative face" (B&L, 1987:99). The 
claim is, then, that contextúa! features can make a potential FTA non-face threatening. That 
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is, imperatives, as clear examples of bald on record usage, are acceptable in cases where 
trie act is in the hearer's favour, thus making no face redress necessary. 
This analysis poses fewer problems than B&L's earlier claim that imperatives are often 
used metaphorically. However, the RT accoixnt is still able to deal with such cases elegantly. 
What the scenarios presented by B&L have in common is that the speaker can be reasonably 
certain that the hearer fínds a certain state of affairs desirable. Perhaps he has just knocked 
on her door, prompting her to utter (12): 
(12) Come in. 
Here, the knock on the door makes it mutually manifest that it is desirable to the person 
outside the room (i. e. the knocker) that he enter the room. The speaker' s utterance of (12) 
in response to this knock makes it mutually manifest that this is also her desire and achieves 
relevance in this way. Notice how the appropriacy of the use of the imperative form is still 
determined by the fact that the speaker beüeves that her desire that p is relevaat to her 
hearer.3 Thus this single consideration is able to explain the politeness of utterances of 
imperatives across the whole range of cases discussed by B&L. Moreover, it is able to do 
so without positing the 'metaphoric' use of a sentence type and without having to divide uses 
of the imperative into cases where the face-threatening potential is ignored and cases where 
the act is in the hearer's favour. 
What this analysis shows is that RT has no difficulty in accounting for "the social 
constraints on language use that come under the misleading label of 'politeness'" (O'Neill, 
1988-89:243). Rather, it is able to show how factors such as considerations of the power 
relation between individuáis or the mutually manifest assumptions that characterise the type 
of social group they belong to are brought to bear on the interpretation process, and in doing 
so it demonstrates the theory's potential to greatly improve our understanding of how 
sociocultural factors interplay with the choice of linguistic form and pragmatic strategy to 
produce appropriate language use. 
3. O'NeüTs counter-examples 
Inhis paper, O'Neill (1988-89) presents four classes of language use that he sees as beyond 
the ability of RT to account for. I want to take a cióse look at each of these in this section, 
mainly because they betray a misunderstanding of the theory that appears to be common to 
those who criticise RT for its lack of a social dimensión. Those who accuse RT of being 
"propositional", such as O'Neill, seem to take the theory to be claiming that communication 
consists in the production reception and storage of propositions in the form of assumptions 
and the linguistic forros that represent them. But this is simply not the case. Sperber & 
Wilson stress throughout Relevance that linguistic communication is a form of 
ostensive-inferential communication in which the communicator produces an ostensive 
stimulus which, in combination with considerations of relevance, guides the addressee in 
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the inferential processes of determining the communicator's intended message. It is 
therefore essentialto any meaningful appreciation of the theory that utterances of linguistic 
forms are seen not simply as representations of the speaker' s message, but rather as stimuli 
designed to guide inference. As such, utterances of sentences with the same propositional 
form can be used by the same speaker to communicate different things at different times, 
either to the same audience or to a different audience. This is crucial to the following 
response to O'Neill's coimter-examples. 
The four classes of counter-example that O'Neill (1988-89:257) presents are as follows: 
(A) The maintenance of social relations: The essential point here is that the proposition 
expressed by an utterance might already be "manifest to both speaker and hearer". The 
example O'Neill gives is of one friend saying to another: 
(13) You've shaved your beard off. 
(B) The strengthening of social relations: Suchas when well known information is repeated, 
such as (14) between to individuáis. 
(14) Iloveyou. 
(C) The use of language to exercise power. 
(D) Conversation with a cathartic function: O'Neill gives the example of two examinees 
who, after the examination, "engage in a conversation that consists of the repetition in 
several different ways of the same basic message - that the examination is finished" 
(1988-89:257). 
For O'Neill, the point about these cases is that - on his reading of RT - the utterances 
neither "strengthen ñor weaken [existing assumptions], ñor imply new information" 
(1988-89:257), althoughthey "are relevantto the needs or purposes of those engaged in the 
conversation: to maintain or strengthen social relations, to exercise power, to realise 
cathartic reléase and so on." (1988-89:258). Clearly O'Neill is right in this last remark. 
What I want to show is that RT is able to explain how they achieve this type of relevance and 
henee that these cases in no way invalídate RT. 
Concerning (A), it first needs to be pointed out that while the íact that the hearer of (13) 
has shaved his beard off is manifest to both speaker and hearer, the speaker's utterance of 
(13) achieves relevance both by strengthening any assumption they have that this is mutually 
manifest and by informing the hearer that she has noticed that he has changed his 
appearance in this way. This second way of achieving relevance is the key to understanding 
how such exchanges contribute to the maintenance of social relations. As the use of the 
word maintenance implies, social relations need relational work if they are to be sustained. 
In RT terms, this is to say that assumptions regarding one individual's relationship with 
another need regular confirmation. Exchanges such as (13) help provide this confirmation 
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by indicaüng that certain aspects of the hearer's behaviour and appearance are relevant to 
the speaker. In this case, the hearer's face is literally the topic of the exchange, but at an 
interpersonal level bis positive face - on B&L's térras - is also being addressed (cf. 
Escandell-Vidal, 1996:642-643). 
RT would predict that the amount attention paid to maintaining social relations by 
attending to face wants is dependent on the strength of the assumptions concerning the 
relationship in question: the stronger the assumptions, the less work the relationship should 
need to maintain it. Indeed, Wolfson's 'bulge effect' does seem to support this prediction 
(Wolfson, 1988, 1989 a & b). Wolfson's analysis of data drawn from ethnographic studies 
reveáis that the proportion of a speaker's verbal behaviour that can be put down to 
considerations of politeness varíes according to the degree of intimacy between the speaker 
and the hearer in the following way: it is lowest between those who are either cióse intimates 
or socially very distant, while it is highest among those who fall between these two points 
on the scale. In RT terms, the effort to make manifest assumptions which confirm the nature 
of the relationship is notnecessary between intimates because these assumptions are strong 
and require litíle further strengthening. Between socially very distant interlocutors there are 
no such assumptions and similarly no strengthening is required. Between interactants who 
fall between these two stools, though, the assumptions will be relatively fragüe: easily 
contradicted by only slight evidence. Thus speakers in such interactions find it worth their 
while to take special care in their choice of linguistic stimuli to avoid making manifest 
assumptions which contradict these. Moreover, those with whom the speaker is on this type 
of terms - neither intímate ñor distant - are likely to nave a strong influence on her standing 
in the groups to which they belong (being, say, workmates) and it is consequently worth her 
while to expend greater effort in ensuring that her behaviour is not misconstrued than she 
would with strangers, who are likely to have little or no effect on her status in this way. 
But not only must speakers try hard to avoid providing evidence to contradict 
assumptions concerning their relationship with the hearer, they must also make efforts to 
reinforce these. Thus O'NeüTs second supposed counter-example to RT: the strengthening 
of social relations, as exemplified by (14). Now, love is the basis of the mosthighly valued 
human relations and assumptions concerning such a fundamental emotion have 
wide-ranging implications and henee merit repeated processing. Consider how an utterance 
of (14) would achieve relevance as a request for forgiveness, as evidence that the speaker 
was being truthful, or as an explanation for a generous deed. Likewise O'NeüTs fourth 
case: the cathartic function of language. Here, on RT terms, the examinees repeatthe fact 
that the exam is over because the implications of this are so numerous and diverse that 
re-processing of this information is justified: the upper limit on cognitive effeets takes a long 
time to reach. 
O'NeüTs third case - the use of language to exercise power - has already been touched 
in the previous section on imperatives. There, situations in which it is appropriate to use the 
imperative with desirable-to-the-speaker interpretations are shown to be characterised by 
the mutually manifest assumption that the speaker's desires are relevant to the hearer; and 
cases where the speaker has a power advantage over the hearer are prime examples of this. 
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Notice, moreover, that it raay be just this assumption which the speaker wishes to make 
(more) manifest to the hearer. By using an imperative in such a way that the only feasible 
interpretation requires supplying the assumption that the speaker believes that she has a 
power advantage over the hearer, the speaker can communicate this assumption. One can 
easily envisage a case where a teacher who has hitherto tried using so-called polite forms 
to quell an unruly class switches to the use of the imperative mood to remind her pupils of 
her power advantage over them. 
Thus the cases O'Neill presents as examples of the intrinsic asocialness of RT are in fact 
no such thing. Rather, the theory is able to explain these in a straightforward manner. This 
is further evidence of RT' s ability to shed light on socially motivated instances of language 
use. In the section that follows, I put forward a more general argument to this effect. 
4. OnRT's social dimensión 
In the previous two sections I nave shown how on the one hand RT is able to provide an 
insight into what might be considered a sociolinguistic question (the appropriate use of 
imperatives) and on the other how cases presented as examples of the asocialness of the 
theory are quite within the scope of its explanatory power. In this section, my approach is 
different as I want to present a far more general argument against the view that RT is 
intrinsically asocial. 
At the root of RT is the claim that humans pay attention to stimuli likely to be relevant 
to them. A stimulus is relevant to the extent that for any given improvement in the 
individual's representation of the world, the effort involved in achieving this is íow: the 
lower the effort, the greater the relevance. In order to make predictions concerning which 
type of stimuli will be relevant, then, it is necessary first to make some assumptions about 
the design of the cognitive system in question. For what purposes, we must ask, was the 
system designed? Or, put another way, what were the evolutionary pressures that drove the 
selection of that system? 
In the case of human cognition, one answer to this question is suggested by Humphrey 
(1976). The fact that humans live in highly complex social environments can tell us a great 
deal about the design of their cognitive systems, he argües. Indeed, his insight is that the 
ability required to form and maintain alliances, to keep track of one's relative status and that 
of others, to calcúlate the likely effect of one' s actions on the way others think of you and 
their likely responses to your actions presupposes a cognitive system not only of great 
computational power but also tailor-made for the job. More recently, similar claims have 
been made by researchers working in the field of evolutionary psychology, a notable 
example being the work of Tooby & Cosmides, who focus particularly on the implications 
for cognitive design of the need for co-operation while at the same time avoiding 
exploitation by free-loaders (see for example Tooby & Cosmides, 1992 and Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992). 
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If it is accepted that a proper ftmction4 of human cognition is to provide an adequate 
representation of the individual's social environment then, on RT terms, it follows that 
stimuli which make manifest assumptions relating to this aspect of her cognitive 
environment will be highly relevant as the assumptions they give rise to will be easy to 
process, this being what the cognitive system - or, rather, a significant part of it5 - has been 
designed for. The question that follows is clearly: what type of stimuli serve to feed the 
human cognitive system's hunger for information regarding the social world? Symbols of 
status abound and it would be hard to deny that we readily attend to these. But there is 
another class of stimuli which must be considered in this light. 
By performing an ostensive act, an individual invites her audience to infer her 
intentions. That is, she invites her audience to attribute to her a mental state. She does this 
by modifying her and her audience's mutual cognitive environment in such a way as to 
make her intentions mutually manifest. The audience, for its part, employs mutually 
manifest assumptions as premises in inferring her intention. These are assumptions already 
mutually manifest before the ostensive act and those made mutually (more) manifest by the 
act. As the earlier section on imperatives showed, some of these assumptions will relate to 
the nature of the relationship between the communicator and her audience. Recall that it was 
shown how the assumption of a power differential or assumptions of solidarity were 
necessary to interpret certain utterances of imperative sentences. Thus ostensive acts, 
especially acts of linguistic communication, are a prime source of information about one's 
social environment. Consideration of the assumptions the speaker assumes mutually 
manifest reveáis a great deal about her estimation of the social distance, both horizontal and 
vertical, between her and the hearer. 
Speakers, of course, know this and take it into account when formulating their 
utterances. A speaker has to try to make manifest no assumptions incompatible with 
mutually manifest assumptions about her relationship with the hearer when choosing her 
stimulus. She can, of course, try to convince the hearer that the esteem in which she holds 
him is in fect higher than he had assumed mutually manifest; and she can intend to make it 
mutually manifest that it is in fact lower than he had assumed. The permutations are 
complex and discussed in detail in Jary (1998). The crucial point here is that the fect that 
any indication as to the hearer's status in the speaker's representation of the social 
environment will be highly relevant to the hearer due to the relative ease with which they 
can be processed, and this gives an important social dimensión both to the speaker's choice 
of linguistic form and the hearer's interpretation of this. In particular, the hearer will easily 
be distracted from the speaker's informative intention if an assumption he is forced to 
supply in order to arrive at this contradicts assumptions relating to his social status he had 
thought mutually manifest. In such a case, the speaker's stimulus is relevant, but not (only) 
for the reasons she had intended. 
In sum, the argument presented here goes as follows: 
(a)Human cognition is, in part, designed to keep track of the individual's social 
environment. This means that the processing of stimuli likely to improve the 
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individual 's representation of her social environment will require a relatively low 
degree of effort and thus these stimuli will generally be relevant to that individual. 
(b) The interpretation of linguistic stimuli can depend on employing mutually 
manifest assumptions relating to the relationship between the speaker and the 
hearer as premises in this deductive process. Given (a), linguistic stimuli are thus 
a source of information regarding the hearer's status in the speaker's representation 
of their mutual social environment. Moreover, any evidence of a mismatch 
between the hearer's representation of this environment and the speaker's is likely 
to prove relevant to the hearer. 
(c) Speaker's take (b) into account when formulating their utterances (and hearers 
expect them to). This reveáis a hitherto somewhat occluded social dimensión to the 
RT account of utterance interpretation. 
Clearly, the notion of metarepresentation is central both to ostensive-inferential 
communication and to the ability to function in a complex social environment (see Sperber, 
1996: 147). Communication, on the RT view, involves the representation by the 
communicators of each others' representations of the world. Sirnilarly, success in a social 
group of human complexity also presupposes the ability to represent representations 
attributed to other social actors. Indeed, it is interesting to note how individuáis whose 
ability to attribute mental states to others is impaired, such as sufferers of autism, 
demónstrate both social and communicative déficits (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
An appreciation of the role played by metarepresentation also helps explain how, despite 
Talbot's (1993) protestation to the contrary, the claim that differences in individuáis' 
cognitive environments stem from differences in their physical environments and cognitive 
capacities (Sperber & Wilson. 1995:39) in no way precludes a social dimensión to those 
cognitive environments. Physical stimuli serve as not only as input to the process of 
representing the physical world but also to the process of constructing a representation of 
the social world. Human behaviour - verbal or otherwise - produces modifications in the 
physical environment which serve as input to those parts of human cognition dedicated to 
monitoring both the social landscape and the individual's relative position in it. 
5. Concluding remarks 
My claim is not that RT can tell the whole story without giving further consideration to 
sociocultural rnatters. Indeed, one criticism of RT which I have not addressed is that it 
overemphasises the creative element of human behaviour at the expense of the conventional 
(Mey & Talbot, 1988:747). The lack of attention paid to this issue should not be taken to 
imply that I do not take it seriously. Conventions surely play a role in the interpretation of 
utterances and I consider it a challenge for any theory of linguistic communication to 
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explain, in a psychologically plausible way, how creativity and convenüon interact in this 
process.6 Nevertheless, the arguments presented in this paper demónstrate that there is 
nothing intrinsically asocial about RT. Indeed, any attempt to explain behaviour by 
reference to the social environment impües certain information processing abilities. RT 
seeks to provide an explicit account of these abilities and is therefore of great potential valué 
to an adequate understanding of humans as social beings. 
Notes 
1. More accurately (but also more awkwardly), she makes manifest her belief that a stimulus 
which makes manifest her desires is relevant to her hearer by virtue of the fact that it makes these 
desires manifest. Relevance, as a posting by Gloria Origgi to the Relevance e-mail list (10 April 
1996) drummed into me, is a feature of stimuli, not of beliefs/desires. Thus saying, as I do in 
this paper, that a desire/belief or some information is relevant to a hearer is short-hand for saying 
that a certain linguistic stimulus is relevant to that hearer because it makes manifest to him a 
certain desire/belief or some information. 
2. This also accounts for Brown & Levinson's "sympathetic advice or warnings" and "cliché 
farewell formulae" (1987:98). 
3. And is correct in believing so. Were she incorrect, then her choice of the imperative form 
would be inappropriate. 
4. See Milikan (1993: Chapter 1) for a historical/causal account of the notion of proper 
function. 
5. In saying that a significant part of the human cognitive system has adapted to perform 
social functions I side step the question of whether this constitutes a mental faculty of the type 
proposed by Jackendoff (1992, Chapter 4) or whether it is the result of a number of more specific 
cognitive domains working in concert, as is suggested by Cosmides and Tooby (1994:98). 
6. A potential source of enlightenment is Sperber's work on the epidemiology of 
representations, in which sociocultural phenomena such as convention are analysed in terms of 
the individual representations that constitute them, in a manner analogous to the role played by 
pathology in the study of epidemics (Sperber, 1996). 
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